Alberta’s Public Accounts Committee- Thoughts on Accountability and Public Service Neutrality
The purpose of this post is to the delve into the accountability aspects of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in Alberta through the lens of one meeting which took place on 7 May 2024. The transcript of the meeting can be found here and the video proceedings here.
Readers may wish to skip over the detail about the meeting to read the conclusions at the foot of this essay.
I attended this meeting because a colleague and I provided briefing material for Marlin Schmidt, NDP MLA for Edmonton Goldbar about the Auditor General’s report on Key Audit Matters.
This post serves as a companion piece to my interview with Professor Jared Wesley on the state of democracy in Alberta. As discussed below, the Public Accounts Committee serves as one of the principal structures of holding governments accountable for their actions and is arguably the second most important mechanism, after Question Period, to hold government ministers and ministries accountable. Given the Smith government’s tendency to conduct its affairs by limiting dissent and centralizing control in the Premier’s office – not an Alberta-only phenomenon, how this committee, chaired by an opposition member, functions to hold both public servants and ministers ultimately to account, is vitally important. The transparency offered by the questioning of senior officials in theory should improve transparency and ultimately improve government policy-making.
Background
Under our parliamentary system of government, by convention the Public Accounts Committee is chaired by an opposition member. This practice dates back to the reforms in the 1860s when William Gladstone was the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This committee examines the activities of all government ministries. Another feature is the presence of officials from the Auditor General’s office who must answer questions concerning their audit work and reports. This body did and was to perform a crucial role in holding governments to account. This is especially true since the Auditor General, as an independent watchdog of the public purse, was expected to report to parliament on the accuracy of the public accounts and more recently whether program expenditures were achieving results and value for money was received. For the classic Canadian exposition of this role and the history of the Audit Office see Norman Ward’s classic The Public Purse, published in 1951. As matters evolved in Canada, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, the Auditor General became associated with revealing government scandals which became welcome fodder for the media.
As a young man I experienced directly a foundation of accountability while a young staffer in Canada’s Auditor General’s office. In 1976, the federal Office of the Auditor General’s Office (OAG) discovered multi-million-dollar payments by the Atomic Energy Corporation Limited to agents working to promote AECL’s sale of Candu reactors to South Korea. The purported secret payments were undocumented, and the OAG did not make judgments about the payments themselves, only that they were poorly documented. This finding underpinned J.J. Macdonnell’s claim that Parliament had lost or was close to losing control of the public purse.
Looking back at this episode nearly fifty years on, I am left feeling that the significance of the PAC and the OAG has diminished as governments have become more complex. The complexity includes new institutional mechanisms which insert themselves into the environment that Canadian deputy ministers must manage. The creation of legislative offices such as the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Ethics Commissioners and Privacy and Freedom of Information Commissioners means that deputy heads must be cognizant of the scrutiny from not only one source but many. These offices give powers to the incumbents to investigate, question members of the public service and elected officials, and to report their findings to the legislative assembly. Also, as Donald Savoie and others have written about is the consolidation of power in the centre of the government- the prime minister’s and premiers’ offices.
The Phalanx
Appearances before the PAC are attended by senior officials from the ministry involved. These two-hour meetings give an opportunity for opposition and government MLAs to ask questions about the ministry’s annual report, financial statements, and recommendations from the Auditor General on the ministry’s activities.
For Treasury Board and Finance (TBF), the phalanx of officials in attendance is especially large because not only is TBF a central agency responsible for budget planning and fiscal policy but because key agencies report through to the Minister. These key agencies include the Alberta Investment Management Corporation (AIMCo), ATB Financial, the Alberta Securities Commission, the Public Service Commission, Communications and Public Engagement, and the Alberta Gaming, Liquor and Cannabis Corporation. Another critical function undertaken by the ministry include financial institutions regulation and policy, pension policy and regulation, and the Public Service Commission. Besides four senior officials sitting beside the deputy minister were senior officials from the ministry and representatives from the agencies mentioned above.
Given the very broad scope of the ministry’s responsibilities, I could see that the briefing book prepared for senior officials was about three inches thick. This implies the serious effort of the ministry’s preparation for the meeting. While I had no direct view of the pages in the briefing book, I could infer that various questions were anticipated and suggested answers provided to those questions. This was evident especially from hearing the questioning of officials by government members.
In addition to the phalanx of officials and the paucity of members of the public in attendance, there were at least a half dozen staffers to the Committee and a member of the Legislature’s security detail. No members of the public or journalists attended virtually and, as far as I could tell, I was surrounded by public servants coming to support their deputy.
A brief presentation of the department’s activities during fiscal 2022-23 (Transcript PA-93-94) included a survey of budget results noting “Our surplus was higher than estimated, which is a reflection and a reminder of the volatility we continue to experience in our revenue streams.” Ms. Kate White, the ministry’s deputy minister noted higher than expected corporate income tax revenue and lower than budget investment income. She highlighted the responses of the ministry to the recommendations of the Auditor General.
Alberta Pension Plan (APP)
The first series of questions came from the NDP MLA for Edmonton Decore Sharif Haji. Haji was first elected in May 2023 and previously was the executive director for the Africa Centre. Haji has degrees in public health from the University of Alberta and the University of South Africa. His first series of questions pertained to the activities of the ministry with respect to withdrawal from the Canada Pension Plan. It was unfortunate this member was not aware of Abpolecon.ca’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy FOIPP request which at least offered a chronology, if little else, of the ministry’s mandate given to Travis Toews and then Nate Horner to explore the feasibility of an APP.
Sharif Haji Source:: Legislative Assembly of Alberta
Haji’s questions related primarily to the work carried out by Lifeworks. In the dialogue between the member and the deputy minister, it became evident that the ministry did not do any analysis because it did not have the actuarial expertise to carry out an examination of the merits of the APP. She confirmed, as my FOIPP request made evident, that the ministry did not have the actuarial resources nor the desire to bring in-house actuarial resources to conduct the study (Transcript PA-95-96). Through the dialogue, the deputy head made clear that the ministry positioned this undertaking as an ”independent” exercise carried out any external resources. She also confirmed that the APP project was not a higher priority than other policy issues facing the ministry:
Ms. White: the Alberta pension plan report was something, as has been stated previously, that was kind of the next steps from the Fair Deal Panel report, it wasn’t any more of a high priority, for example, than the insurance work we were doing or the budget work we were doing or the fiscal planning work we were doing. (Transcript PA-96)
Ms. White also made clear that the Lifeworks report, released by the government in September 2023 was not a “co-creation” between the ministry officials and Lifeworks, except the normal sharing of draft reports, staff discussion, and meetings with the actuary. From these exchanges I inferred that the ministry was distancing itself from the findings of the report.
Government Members – praise for the ministry
Like with Question Period, the objective of opposition members is to embarrass the government, while government backbenchers speak to support government ministers, policies, and actions.
When the government members questioned ministry officials, this purpose was abundantly clear and underlines the performative nature of these meetings as a means to legitimize government policies and decisions. These performances illustrates how closely controlled the backbench MLAs are by the party whip and, by extension, the Premier’s office.
Below are a few examples that illustrative these behaviours.
Mr. Garth Roswell MLA for Vermillion-Lloydminster-Wainwright was elected in April 2019. Roswell was a financial adviser for over 16 years with Edward Jones Investments and “has an extensive background in agriculture business.”
I’m just curious. You’ve got no new ones, so you guys are, you know, doing a pretty tight job there.. (Transcript PA-97).
That’s great. It’s good. Keep up the good work. (Transcript PA-98)
A subject that UCP party members are evidently proud is the government’s role in red tape reduction. Mr. Wiebe, MLA for Grande-Prairie-Wapiti, elected in 2023 “had a 40-year career in the transportation industry, including starting a transportation company with his father and brothers.” Wiebe’s question on regulatory reform allowed the deputy to read into the record the ministry’s performance including a very lengthy response including amendments to the insurance agents and adjusters regulation, and the Credit Union Act, its associated regulations, and application processes at AGLC.
Ms. White: Finally, we had the regulatory sandbox. Government introduced legislation to enable a regulatory sandbox in Alberta on the finance side, allowing financial services and financial technology companies to test innovative products and services without immediately meeting all regulatory requirements. The sandbox encourages innovation while informing the modernization of industry regulations by identifying red tape or regulatory burdens that some companies may face.
Mr. Wiebe: On page 28 of the report it discusses a number of actions that the Public Service Commission took in support of red tape reduction. Can the department please expand on these red tape reduction efforts and how they supported employees in focusing more time on providing services to Albertans and less time on administrative tasks? (Transcript PA-98)
Ron Wiebe Source: Alberta Legislative Assembly
This particular question, obviously read from a briefing note prepared for the member, was answered by the Public Service Commissioner, Ms Caltagirone. The prepared response was also read into the record (Transcript PA 98-99, Video record 8:45 -8.46 a.m.)
Further puffballs followed by Mr. Wiebe including the leading question:
I think this is a really telling sign of what this government has managed to do regarding red tape reduction. I see that the target of 33 per cent was exceeded and a reduction of 34.33 per cent was achieved in ’22-23. What factors contributed to being able to not only meet but exceed this target? (PA-99).
The following response was also anticipated in the following response by the deputy.
Ms. White: Maybe I’ll just highlight that the AIRB actually accomplished an 81 per cent reduction from its baseline count, which I guess shows you that it was quite ripe to have a look at. The Alberta Securities Commission accomplished 67 per cent red tape reduction from its baseline count through the repeal of several local rules and offering memorandum requirements. Again, I mentioned AGLC earlier. AGLC accomplished a 41 per cent reduction from its baseline count largely due to the review of its policy handbooks. (Transcript PA 99).
Mr. McDougall: Key objective 1.4 is to “maintain fiscal discipline and spending to support the government’s fiscal targets and work closely with ministries to deliver on the commitments the government has made to Albertans in the Government of Alberta Strategic Plan.” I see on page 33 that the province had a surplus of $11.6 billion in ’22-23. Can you elaborate a little bit on what are the actions that the department took to help ensure such a strong surplus budget in ’22-23? (Transcript PA-101)
A following question allowed the deputy minister to burnish Alberta’s reputation as a prudent fiscal manager compared to other provinces.
Mr. McDougall: How would you quantify, you know, if we wanted to compare to B.C. or Ontario and other places? Is there a kind of general comment you can make as to what our advantage is there in terms of their funding costs?
Ms White: Absolutely. We’re certainly happy to table bond spreads. I won’t take you through the whole graphic. It’s a little bit difficult to do verbally, but what I can say is that the commitment to fiscal discipline and paying down debt, as I just mentioned, really laid the groundwork. One of the things the department does is work with the credit-rating agencies to tell the story so that they have questions, not unlike the committee, on where our spending and revenue is going and how we’re managing it. We work with the credit-rating agencies to ensure that story is transparent and told well, and this laid the groundwork for subsequent upgrades.
If we compare to B.C., unfortunately, our colleagues in B.C. have laid a different path. They’ve recently – again, probably groundwork laid back in ’22-23 – you know, subsequently been put on warning and even downgraded. In terms of the relative performance of our debt-to-GDP: 9.9 per cent by March 2023. Compared to British Columbia, they were at 15.4 per cent. We always want to compare to Ontario because they’re big borrowers: 38.2 per cent. Government of Canada: 45.6 per cent. You can’t find someone on this chart that is anywhere close. I guess closest would be Saskatchewan at 12.8 per cent. Yeah. We continue to see the debt-to-GDP ratio improve as the economy grows and debt reduces. (Transcript PA 101)
Jackie Lovely Source: Alberta Legislative Assembly
Ms. White: Basically, we were able to massively reduce borrowing and, ultimately, our borrowing costs by using what was sitting in everyone’s bank accounts already.
Ms Lovely: Fantastic. As the report notes, “Alberta has maintained its competitive corporate tax environment, making it a prime destination for global investment.” Can the department please explain how Albertans and the Alberta economy benefited from Alberta’s competitive corporate tax environment in ’22-23? How much new investment was attracted to Alberta in ’22-23, and what sectors were these investments focused on?
Ms White: Thank you very much for the question. Alberta competes for investment with other jurisdictions kind of internationally, within Canada and within the United States but all over the world. Since businesses often invest where they’ll achieve the highest returns, it’s really imperative that our province is positioned to attract investment. Cutting the general corporate income tax rate from 12 per cent to 8 per cent is one of the government’s key platforms and planks in terms of competitiveness and investment attraction and steps taken to attract capital.
In 2022 we saw the Alberta economy really gain momentum. Real GDP rose by an estimated 5.1 per cent, with nearly all sectors of the economy expanding. We recovered at the time from the COVID-19 downturn and surpassed the 2014 peak, so you could say that there was a bounce from COVID, but there was also additional growth above that. Alberta’s economy continued to expand into 2023 although headwinds from rising interest rates and high inflation were already starting to moderate growth. Business investment contributed to the economic growth in ’22 and ’23. According to Stats Canada nominal business investment in Alberta’s non-residential sector grew 21 per cent, a huge number, or $11.7 billion, in 2022 and an additional 5.6 per cent, or another $3.7 billion, in 2023.
Ms Lovely: Thank you. Page 30 of the TBF ’22-23 annual report discusses how communications and public engagement collaborated with numerous ministries to help position and market Alberta as an attractive place for investment and skilled workers in high-demand sectors. As part of this work in August ’22 Alberta Is Calling, a national recruitment campaign, was launched to encourage skilled workers from Vancouver, Toronto, southern Ontario, and Atlantic Canada to move to Alberta for career opportunities, high earnings, low taxes, and an affordable lifestyle. How is the success of Alberta Is Calling measured?
I also see that the province saw more than $58 billion in non-residential business investment in ’22. Can the department please provide a breakdown of the sectors and the industries that these investments were made in?
Chantelle de Jonge Source: Legislative Assembly of Alberta
Another example of the exchange to burnish the government’s image was Ms. De Jonge’s question about the ministry’s role in the affordability initiative. The response went on for three long paragraphs.
Ms de Jonge: Thank you, through the chair. I appreciate that additional insight on red tape reduction.
Now switching to affordability concerns, I hear from many of my constituents and folks across Alberta who are impacted by inflation and the high cost of living, which is certainly a global phenomenon. Our government is of course committed to supporting Albertans, so I was glad to read on page 21 that “TBF supported government-wide efforts to take quick [and] effective action to deliver relief measures to assist Albertans with the rising cost of living due to inflation.” Through the chair, can the department please outline what actions were taken in 2022-23 to address the affordability concerns of Albertans, and can you please inform the committee how much money Albertans saved through these measures?
Ms White: Again, thank you for the question. In November 2022, as the committee knows, the government launched the affordability action plan, or AAP, which focused on measures to reduce costs for Albertans and provide targeted support for families, seniors, and vulnerable Albertans. Actions taken under the AAP included the following, and I’ll just apologize in advance; this is a long list. Indexation of the personal income tax system, which saved Albertans $304 million in ’22-23 due to lower withholding taxes on their paycheques, larger refunds, and lower taxes owed on even their 2022 personal income tax returns. The fuel tax relief program saved Albertans and Alberta businesses $1.2 billion in ’22-23 by pausing the fuel tax. Again, that was at 13 cents per litre on gasoline and diesel, and 4 cents per litre on marked gasoline and diesel. The electricity rebate program provided over $628 million in rebates in ’22-23 to approximately 1.9 million Alberta homes, firms, and businesses by applying rebates to power bills from July ’22 to April ’23. The affordability payments program provided direct payments of up to $600 over six months from January to June 2023 to seniors, families, and vulnerable Albertans living on core benefit programs like assured income for the severely handicapped, income support, Alberta seniors’ benefit, and persons with developmental disabilities. In ’22-23 a total of $440 million was provided through these payments.
Effective January 1, 2023, the government committed to the indexation of monthly benefits for AISH, income support, and the Alberta seniors’ benefit and the Alberta child and family benefit. This provided $51 million in additional support in ’22-23. Again, the government allocated $24 million for wage increases for social service workers in disability services, homeless shelters, and family violence prevention programs. Continuing care operators received $19 million to off-set inflation, which shielded continuing care residents from full cost-of-living increases. The government also provided grants like the $10 million to food banks and civil society organizations. These measures supported vulnerable Albertans in communities throughout the province. (Transcript PA-106)
This mastery of these details and the enthusiasm in the presentation clouds the delineation between senior government officials and the government party.
The OAG report highlighted that the department was having difficulty receiving reliable information on the total number of sites for which it has not recorded a liability, the number of sites where the responsible parties are still unknown, and the undiscounted value of recorded liabilities. Schmidt prefaced his question by referring to multiple reports and concerns on environmental liabilities by the Auditor General. Schmidt asked what the ministry’s plans were to address the “potential risks of unfunded environmental liabilities.” (Transcript PA 102). The deputy noted that the “that the majority of that performance will be under the department of environment.” She then asked the provincial Controller to elaborate. Mr. Stadlwieser confirmed TBF was “working with the Auditor General very closely in those departments to improve that in some ways this year, but it’s an ongoing exercise.” (Transcript PA-102).
Schmidt also wished to know whether TBF was committed to making information more easily available to Albertans, noting that Energy and Environment department officials had been “quite skilful in avoiding accountability” when present before the PAC. TBF officials were also equally adept at dodging direct accountability. In her reply Ms. White invoked the doctrine of ministerial accountability.
Ms. White: the main role we play is through Dan’s role as the Provincial Controller. Again, our accountability, our job is to ensure everything that you’ve said: that Albertans have the very best and most transparent financial information, which would include environmental liability.
I can definitely commit that we continue to support and work with our department colleagues and with the Auditor General….. But in terms of ensuring – so the line that we’re always on is with ministerial accountability. Certainly, the role of the Controller is to take responsibility for the accuracy of the financial statements, and that will be the role that we will commit to and continue to commit to and to working with our department colleagues to ensure ever-increasing transparency for Albertans.
Mr. Schmidt then turned to the interplay between the OAG’s concerns and the evaluation of Alberta’s credit standing by rating agencies given the OAG’s identification of environmental liabilities as a top audit risk. Ms. White acknowledged that “ESG performance” was something watched by agencies, but she did not answer directly whether rating agencies have asked specific questions about the province’s environmental liabilities.
Schmidt then asked the OAG’s Assistant Auditor General at what point would the Office consider issuing a qualified opinion. Mr. Ireland dodged the hypothetical question noting the ultimate question was about funding the potential liabilities and the auditor had no evidence there was a material error in the financial statements. (Transcript PA-103). Mr. Ireland also confirmed that the Alberta OAG has not raised the issue of disclosure and measurement of environmental liabilities with the Public Sector Accounting Standards Board, a surprising response given the importance of the risk.
Analysis and Opinion
It is no surprise that opposition members will look for policy or administration failures by the government of the day. That is their job. Still there is a higher duty to discover flaws and work to encourage the repair of these flaws. Nor is it surprising that government members will lob easy questions to government officials to highlight the good deeds of the government. It is also to be expected that deputy ministers, who serve at the pleasure of the provincial cabinet (effectively the Premier’s office), should exhibit a degree of loyalty to the elected government. Yet the notion of “fearless” policy advice from deputies is central to the existence of a politically neutral, non-partisan public service. The line between partisan participation and public service is circumscribed by standards of ethics overseen by the Public Service Commission which is part of the public service. Central agency deputies unlike other deputies are unique as they have more interaction with politicians through the Treasury Board process which establishes the funding for the government’s program. Since budgets fund the promises and policies of the current government, central deputies have little choice but to defend their ministry and, by extension, the government of the day. However, the extent to which a non-partisan public service defends the government is the true measure of the independence of the public service from the dictates of elected officials.
When there is fundamental disagreement on policy, the deputy either resigns, is replaced or moved to another ministry or outside government. This has been a pattern largely unobserved in Alberta. Resignations are rare but the movement around of deputies like simple pieces on a chessboard began under the Klein government and has led to administration by process managers often with limited technical expertise in policy field they are responsible for. Again this is not a purely Alberta phenomenon.
The problem of the separation or distribution of power between the domain of politicians and officialdom exists in all Westminster systems and the degree of partisanship within the bureaucracy waxes and wanes. From the microcosm of this one PAC meeting, I conclude that there has been an erosion of independence from political/partisan direction. That said, the APP question and answers show that the department worked to distance itself from the actual report, stating on the record that there was no “co-creation.” Moreover, the consultant’s remarkable number of 53 per cent of the CPPIB’s assets was a “surprise” to officials.
According to the record obtained through my FOIPP request and answers of the deputy minister, the ministry did not have the resources to handle the request stemming from the Fair Deal Report. Nor apparently did they not want the resources. This answer is a problem for a variety of reasons. Firstly, government pension and insurance policy development rely on a deep understanding of actuarial science. Second, her answer to Haji on auto insurance suggested the ministry tended to defer to the arms-length Automobile Insurance Rate Board to judge the competitiveness of the auto insurance market and its fairness to consumers. This lack of actuarial expertise is problematic because auto insurance costs impact a majority of Alberta families with costs running into thousands of dollars per year. To rely on a industry regulator whose history of decision-making has been highly supportive of the industry is a problem. Third, equally important is the need for actuarial expertise in the pension area. The province directly and through government agencies and school boards funds billions of dollars as employer contributions. Furthermore, as a sponsor of public sector pension funds and as an employer, there should be a fiduciary interest in assuring the investment management As Ms. White noted at PAC, pensions are complex and for a government not to have in-house expertise is poor public administration. To rely on external expertise which may be conflicted by the amount of work done by contracting actuaries for the insurance industry is also problematic.
The biggest problem however is what I was unable to find from my FOIPP request on the Alberta Pension Plan. I was unable to confirm that the ministry had conducted a policy options examination on the pros and cons of withdrawing from the Canada Pension Plan. As noted, the integrity and neutrality of civil service work is based on the giving of “fearless” policy advice to ministers. This includes the pros and cons of proceeding on a course of action. It may be objected that the work was done but shielded by exemptions such as advice to ministers. Under the FOIPP Act it is the deputy minister who decides what is released, not the minister. The deputy may or may not release documents whether they fall under various exemptions, it is a discretionary power. If used wisely it can serve as a shield to stop disastrous policies proceeding because elected officials may not want to be perceived as overruling the unbiased, evidence assessment of career public servants. This issue of opinion and scientific evidence is most pronounced in the recent debate over powers of the Chief Medical Officer and the UCP government.
While the deputy minister said that the APP was not given any special priority, my FOIPP request revealed that there was a high degree of coordination between the deputy and the minister’s office and staff in Executive Council which is presided over by the Premier. My FOIPP request also found that PowerPoint presentations to government officials and to the media fully conformed to the Lifeworks’ report. It appears therefore that the ministry felt no need to critically examine the claims and findings of the report. Or, if they did, the public will never know.
My overall conclusion is from attending the PAC and research into the APP decision-making process is that Alberta’s public service is too deferential and fails to examine policy through the lens of the public interest. This is evident from the apparent inability, or unwillingness of TBF to direct Energy, the Alberta Energy Regulator, or Environment and Protected Areas (sic) to provide timely, meaningful and a full accounting on sites where environmental liabilities have accrued. Under sections 6 and 13 of the Financial Administration Act, Treasury Board and the minister responsible administering the Act have extensive powers to obtain information from government and agency officials, subject to any limitations on the right to disclose that information. Although these powers are those of elected officials, practically they are delegated to the deputy head. In the case of obtaining more information on environmental liabilities in order to fulfill the ministry’s obligation to properly compile the province’s financial statements, is an administrative matter, not a political matter. It is in both the public interest and the ministry’s responsibility to determine the extent of these liabilities which may become contingent liabilities of the government. This matter is one of significant public importance and not a matter for invoking ministerial responsibility.
Unfortunately, environmental liabilities in Alberta, as a purely accounting matter, has never been an administrative matter. Like health policy, environmental liabilities have become increasingly politicized by successive governments with their heads in the sand. It has been this way in Alberta for decades. Only now are some Albertans beginning to understand how the financial interests of the energy industry permeate the provincial government. I became aware of this most acutely when the Director of the Institute for Public Economics from 2009-2013. I met with two department ministers in two different contexts to, in part, discuss a recent report undertaken to look at high incidences of cancer in the watershed downstream from oilsands operations. The study concluded that there was an insufficient sample to determine if the First Nations peoples were at elevated risk to rare types of cancer. One deputy who happened to be responsible for “aboriginal relations” strongly defended the conclusions of the study. To me it was a bit of a shock that this now former deputy would not be more sympathetic given the remit of her department. In the second occasion, I was meeting with the deputy health minister as a representative of the Canadian Cancer Society (CCS). I raised the question about the concerns about the high level of cancers in First Nations in the Athabasca watershed. This deputy cautioned me that the CCS should be careful with this issue since donors might have second thoughts. At the time I interpreted this as a veiled threat which reinforced my belief in the enormous penetration of Alberta state by oil interests. I could give further examples from my days at Alberta Treasury but this is not the place.
Evidence, consistent with the work of Kevin Taft’s magisterial Oil’s Deep State, Kevin Timoney’sHidden Scourgeand more recent work by Martin Olszynski,Shaun Fluker and others clearly demonstrate that, at a minimum key regulators and ministries have been captured by the energy industry. o These regulators and ministries- Energy and Minerals, Environment and Protected Areas, and the Alberta Energy Regulator – and the officials that lead them are very powerful players in the Alberta Public Service. This result has been the result of the decades long dependence of the provincial exchequer on large, volatile resource revenue- a dependence which leaves the province’s public service vulnerable to the financial and commercial interests of the energy sector and the banking sector which continues to finance the industry.
Afterthought
There was no media in attendance and no articles about this “must-see” performance of this mutual love-in or kumbaya. The meeting’s transcripts go into a type of suspended animation- a play without an engaged audience. This is the destination we have arrived at- the casual indifference to the slow erosion of our democratic institutions. The absence of any witnesses to the slow decline of accountability, a type of “manufactured consent” as Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman wrote about over 35 years ago.
Add to this decline is the asymmetry of information-the potent capacity of the state to gather and analyze information, increasingly in secret against independent researchers and the media which has become increasingly irrelevant in this age of social media. There exists a growing capacity to control narratives and spin stories knowing full well activities will only be scrutinized, if at all, by historians long after the stories’ currencies have waned. These narratives become pablum for an increasingly detached electorate who no longer believe what politicians of all stripes say (see interview with Jared Wesley). We have a public service in Alberta which has become increasingly politicized. As mentioned, this process began under Ralph Klein, which meant deputies would accede to public policy with political spin. This over-emphasis on public communications and engagement at the expense of empirical evidence has become the norm of policy-making in Alberta. Policy is being driven by “belief” rarely backed up by empirical evidence. Add to this brew, the growing lack of transparency which has eviscerated the public’s ability to criticize effectively government policy and you have a new form of performative art.
